Sovereign Bond Disputes before ICSID Tribunals: Lessons from the Argentina Crisis by Simoes, Joanna
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 17 | Number 4 Article 4
2011
Sovereign Bond Disputes before ICSID Tribunals:
Lessons from the Argentina Crisis
Joanna Simoes
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joanna Simoes, Sovereign Bond Disputes before ICSID Tribunals: Lessons from the Argentina Crisis, 17 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 683 (2011)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol17/iss4/4
SOVEREIGN BOND DISPUTES BEFORE
ICSID TRIBUNALS: LESSONS FROM THE
ARGENTINA CRISIS
Joanna Simdes *
I. INTRODUCTIONIN 1991, in order to contain the hyperinflation and reduce debt, the
Argentinean government introduced a new economic plan, the "Con-
vertibilidad." The novel framework declared parity between the Ar-
gentinean peso and U.S. dollars.'
The new regime not only reduced inflation, but experienced an initial
period of high growth rates and a considerable incoming flow of capital.
Notwithstanding, one of the side effects of the Convertibilidad was that it
made the economy vulnerable to foreign crises. The Asian crisis caused
capital to leave the country, and the trade deficit was worsened by the
Brazilian devaluation. Consequently, as dollars were flowing out of the
country, the recession worsened. 2
In 2001, the public began to fear devaluation and a bank run started. It
is reported that approximately one billion dollars were withdrawn daily.3
To sustain the Convertibilidad, the government imposed the corralito-
harsh restrictions on capital movements and cash withdrawals from banks
were set.4 These efforts, however, were not enough to contain the
situation.
Therefore, on December 2001, Argentina announced that it could no
longer service its outstanding external bond debt of over U.S. $100 billion
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2. Werner Baer, Diego Margot & Gabriel Montes-Rojas, Argentina's Default and the
Lack of Dire Consequences, City University of London: Div. oF EcONomics Dis-
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3. Kregel, supra note 1.
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167, 169 (Timothy Besley & Roberto Zagha eds., 2005).
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to both Argentine and non-Argentine creditors.5 In January 2005, while
recovering from the crisis, the Argentine government launched an ex-
change offer to swap the defaulted debt of approximately U.S. $82 billion
in principal and U.S. $20 billion in past due interest for new debt instru-
ment.6 In order to ensure that the bond exchange offer would be success-
ful, the Argentine government promulgated Law n. 26017 which forbade
the reopening of the exchange offer and any negotiations with creditors
that refused to participate in the restructuring process, i.e., the holdout
creditors.7
In February 2005, the period to accept the exchange offer was termi-
nated.8 Thus, in one of the largest and most difficult debt restructurings
of all times,9 Argentina managed to effectively restructure 76.15% of all
holdings.10 Notwithstanding the high degree of participation, the amount
of outstanding debt held by the holdout creditors was still substantial:
U.S. $25 billion."
The holdout creditors tried to enforce Argentina's obligations under
the defaulted bonds in national courts.12 Even though some positive
judgments have been obtained in U.S. federal courts, these individual
creditors have had no success in locating and attaching any Argentine
assets. 13
In light of these facts, in September 2006, a group of 195,000 Italian
bondholders [hereinafter "Abaclat case"] coordinated by the Global
Committee of Argentina Bondholders ("GCAB") submitted a request
for International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC-
SID") arbitration against the Argentine Republic, relying not on a viola-
tion of Argentina's obligation under the bond contract, but on its
obligation under the Italy-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty
("BIT").14 Two other smaller groups of Italian bondholders also decided
to pursue arbitration against Argentina under ICSID [hereinafter "Alpi
5. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion and Admissibility, 9 58 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.iareporter.com/
downloads/20110810/download (not yet reported in ICSID Rep.) (translation by
tribunal).
6. Id. 1 77.
7. Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbi-
tration, 101 AM. J. INT'l L. 711, 714 (2007).
8. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 80.
9. Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, INST. FOR INTL'I
ECON., 19 (Apr. 2005), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/gelpern0405.pdf.
10. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 80.
11. Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Dis-
putes, 17 AM. Riv. INT'L Atu. 335, 335 (2006).
12. Gelpern, supra note 9, at 21.
13. Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to Global Comm. of Arg. Bondholders (GCAB)
(Feb. 15, 2005), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/gcab-releases-legal-
memorandum-summarizing-recent-argentine-legislation-and-bondholder-reme-
dies-54081267.html.
14. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 51. In 2010 a large number of claimants
accepted a new settlement offer proposed by the Argentine government and with-
drew from the ICSID claim. The Abaclat case now involves approximately 60,000
claimants. L.E. Peterson, World Bank Arbitration Tribunal Upholds Jurisdiction
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case' and 'Alemanni case"].'5
All requests were registered.' 6 The proceedings in the Alpi and Ale-
manni cases are still in the jurisdictional phase.' 7 On the other hand, a
unique jurisdictional ruling in the Abaclat case was released to the parties
on August 4, 2011 and upheld ICSID jurisdiction over the sovereign
bonds claim.' 8
Such request confirms a trend towards the filing of arbitration claims
against the Argentine government. Since 2001, dozens of lawsuits have
been filed under the system of international investment arbitration, pro-
vided for in the many BITs entered into by Argentina and major capital-
exporting states of Western Europe and North America.' 9
Despite the array of investment arbitration requests, ICSID arbitra-
tions over sovereign bonds disputes are a new and bold proposal. It
could represent a drastic change in the dynamics of sovereign debt
restructurings and of the investment arbitration regime.
Therefore, in this moment of intensified anxiety of a Greek sovereign
default, there are many pressing issues to be analyzed that are of concern,
not only to Argentina, but to the international community as a whole.
Prima facie, the development of borrowing through sovereign bonds and
the problems faced by states in servicing their sovereign debt will be dis-
cussed. As countries' debt burdens become unsustainable, there is a
growing need for debt restructuring. The existing debt restructuring
mechanisms will be analyzed.
Secondly, the possibility of submitting disputes arising under sovereign
bonds debt to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention") by
alleging a breach of an international obligation set in a BIT will be as-
sessed. Jurisdictional issues that may bar recourse to ICSID will be
scrutinized.
Thirdly, considering that ICSID jurisdiction has been accepted, the
next step would be to discuss whether the standards of protection set in
the relevant BIT (which are determinant to create state responsibility
over treaty breach) were violated. Therefore, section four analyzes two
of the most frequently sought standards of protection: a) fair and equita-
ble treatment, and b) expropriation.
Finally, the last section refers to past awards and recent claims against
the Argentine government to address some of the main concerns against
over Billion Dollar Claim by Italian Victims of Argentine Sovereign Debt Default,
INv. AR. Rii. (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110808.
15. See Alemanni v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8 (2007), http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last visited Oct. 17, 2011); see also Alpi v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (2008), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
16. Alemanni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8; Alpi, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9.
17. Alemanni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8; Alpi v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/08/9.
18. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 242.
19. Gus VAN HARTnN, INVL:SrMFNr TmAry ARurrRATION AND Punt I LAw (2007).
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the use of investment arbitration to solve disputes that arise from a finan-
cial and economic crisis.
II. FINANCIAL CRISES AND SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURINGS
Debt has been one of the main financing mechanisms for states in the
past few years. Thus, from the late 1970s to the present, where lending
increased significantly as a result of the expansion of the Eurodollar mar-
ket and the recycling of petro-dollars, sovereigns have come to depend
deeply on private capital flows. 2 0 By 2009, the total international indebt-
edness amounted to U.S. $24 trillion.21
Amongst the vast array of instruments available to raise capital, bonds
have held a central role in the public finance by becoming one of the
largest domestic and international sources of financing for sovereigns.
The issuance of new sovereign bonds surpasses U.S. $80 billion per
year.22
Bonds can be defined as any interest-bearing or discounted govern-
ment or corporate security in which the issuer has the obligation to pay
the bondholder a specific sum of money, at a definite time, with a fixed
interest.23 The bonds issued by governments, i.e., sovereign bonds, usu-
ally have the same characteristics as the bonds issued by corporations,
with the difference that they are usually denominated in a foreign
currency.
In particular, after the 1982 crises of Latin America, Argentina started
issuing bonds in order to raise funds. From 1991 to 2001, Argentina is-
sued over U.S. $186.7 billion in sovereign bonds in both domestic and
international capital markets. 2 4
Notwithstanding the possibility of a positive impact of lending to the
economic and social development of states, it is unquestionable that this
debt expansion creates repayment problems and thus increases risk of
default, especially in a country with considerable economic vulnerabili-
ties. Thus, as Argentina built up untenable debt obligations, there was an
increasing need to restructure its debt.25
20. Daniel McGovern, Different Market Windows on Sovereign Debt: Private-Sector
Credit from the 1980s to the Present, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS, CRISES AND
RiSTRUCURING 69 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eds., 2003).
21. Portfolio Investment: CPIS Data - Global Tables, INT'L MONETARY FUND, http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/global.htm (last updated June 21, 2011).
22. McGovern, supra note 20, at 76.
23. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICIlONARY OF FINANCE AND IN-
VESTMENT TERMS 59 (8th ed. 2010).
24. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, [ 50.
25. On a side note, it is important to consider that even though countries can argue
that the debt has been raised for the public good and that there are no other alter-
natives to borrowing, there are always means to reduce public borrowing. Unless
borrowing problem is tackled, there will constantly be a risk of a sovereign debt
crisis taking place.
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Sovereign debt restructuring ("SDR") concerns the diverse ways in
which countries that are encountering financial distress change the origi-
nal payment terms of their debt. The modification in the debt contract
usually entails a reduction in the face value of the debt, or an exchange of
the old bonds for new ones with lower interest rates and longer matur-
ity.26 Bond exchanges are currently amongst the few viable solutions for
the reorganization of sovereign debt. Therefore, the need for an effective
debt restructuring mechanism is latent. Thus, such path was chosen by
the Argentine government after the substantial devaluation of the peso
and the default on the external bond debt.
While there is an extensive consensus for the need of an effective re-
structuring regime for countries holding untenable debt, conflicts have
continuously surrounded the development of such process. 2 7 Many pro-
posals have been put forth, including a statutory approach proposed by
the IMF: the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM"). 28
But, such proposal did not receive enough support to be implemented. 29
Currently, the international community has been focusing on a contrac-
tual approach to aid the debt restructuring procedure and is advocating
the use of the Collective Action Clauses ("CACs").
A. THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH: COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
("CACs")
In 1995, during the beginning of the economic crisis in Mexico, a work-
ing group of Ministers and Governors of the G-10 countries was insti-
tuted in order to discuss alternatives to sovereign debt crises. 30 The
group concluded that the sovereign debt restructuring process could be
improved by including CACs in the bond contracts which would provide
for: a) collective representation of debt holders in a restructuring, b) a
majority restructuring, where a qualified majority of bondholders would
be allowed to alter the terms and conditions of bond contracts over the
26. Kevin P. Gallagher, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment
Agreements, UNIrire NAIONs: UNCTAD, 1, 2 (July 7, 2011) http://www.unctad.
org/femplates/Page.asp?intltemlD=6004&lang=1.
27. Randall Dodd, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 9 Tin: FINANeI:R 1,2 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.financialpolicy.org/dscsovdebt.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
28. In 2011, Anne Krueger, former deputy managing director of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), stressed the need for a practical and concrete method to
deal with financial crises and proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mecha-
nism (SDRM). The SDRM was intended to aid sovereign states with untenable
debts. This mechanism would enable states to rearrange their finances while al-
lowing a supermajority of creditors to decide upon the restructuring mechanism.
See Anne Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INT'l MON-
1 IARY FuND, 13-14 (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.
29. Id.
30. The G-10 is comprised of the following 11 countries: Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom and the United States of America in OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms,
'G10 Countries.' Glossary of Statistical Terms: GlO Countries, OECD, http://
stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7022 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
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objection of holdouts, and c) a minimum enforcement component which
requires a minimum of 25 percent of creditors to allow litigation to take
place.31
At this point in time, CACs became widely used in sovereign bonds
issued under English law. But, their inclusion in bonds issued under New
York law was not a standard procedure. 32 In 2002 this prospect started to
change. As an alternative to the IMF's SDRM, the United States and
other G-10 nations started circulating model collective action clauses. To
the markets, they appeared far more appealing in contrast to the
SDRM.33
In February 2003, Mexico incorporated majority action clauses in its
sovereign bonds, thus becoming the first emerging market to issue a SEC-
registered debt under New York law with CACs. 3 4 After Mexico's issu-
ance, other emerging markets have included CACs in their bonds, includ-
ing, amongst others, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. Since then,
most sovereigns' bonds issued under New York law contain CACs. 35 This
trend was followed by the new permanent crisis mechanism of the Euro-
pean Union, the European Stability Mechanism ('ESM').36 By 2013, it
will become mandatory to include CACs in all future sovereign bonds
issued by European countries.37
With the inclusion of CACs in sovereign bond contracts, the collective
action problems that can take place when there are hundreds, or even
thousands, of scattered creditors are reduced.38 By binding all bondhold-
ers to the decision of the majority, CACs will prevent holdout creditors,
i.e., the small group of creditors that refuses to participate in a restructur-
ing process, to file an individual suit against the sovereign debtor for the
execution of a contract whose terms are currently under negotiation.39
Given this framework, the inclusion of CACs in sovereign bonds sim-
plifies the restructuring mechanism and ascertains that the restructuring
process is extended to all. Its effectiveness, however, is still being
verified. 40
31. F. John Drage & Catherine Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses (CACS): An
Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues, BANK OF EN-
GLAND, 1 (Nov. 2, 2004), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2004/
fsrl 7art9.pdf.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action is Changing Sovereign Debt, INST. IFOR1 IN'L
ECON., 19, 20 (May 2003), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/gelpernO804-
2.pdf.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Drage & Hovaguimian, supra note 31.
36. Id.
37. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Mar. 25, 2011, available at
http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1216793/esm %20treaty%20en.pdf.
38. Dodd, supra note 27, at 3.
39. Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy ofNations: Let the Law Reflect Reality, 29 (Univ.




III. INSTITUTIONS AVAILABLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENT OF SOVEREIGN BOND DEBT
To the extent that countries continue to default, absent sovereign bank-
ruptcy and a successful debt restructuring framework, creditors facing de-
fault are confronted with two possible outcomes while seeking to obtain
payment on defaulted sovereign debt: either they 1) get bound to the
exchange offer or 2) they resort to litigation in national courts, claiming a
breach in the bond contract.
The legal remedies available in national courts to holdout creditors,
however, are usually ineffective. 4 1 Not only can enforcement of decisions
from litigation in national courts be limited by sovereign immunity, but
there are only a limited number of assets that can be attached abroad.4 2
As mentioned, creditors have been trying without success to enforce the
decisions obtained against the Argentine government in U.S. Federal
Courts. 43
Given these setbacks, another emerging option has come to light for
non-participating sovereign bondholders in Argentina's restructuring
process: ICSID arbitration. Italian bondholders have claimed a breach
in the international obligations of the government set in the Argentina-
Italy BIT in order to obtain better financial terms than the one offered by
the state.44
ICSID arbitration would have many benefits as compared to litigation
in national courts. First, because the enforcement structure of ICSID
Convention is used, awards against sovereigns can become more widely
enforceable than any other decision in the public law arena.45 Second, an
award rendered by an ICSID tribunal is not subject to substantive review
given that Article 54 of ICSID Convention states:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant
to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judg-
ment of a court in that State.4 6
41. See Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the Next Transforma-
tion of Sovereign Debt. 83 Cin.-KINT L. Raiv. 147 (2008).
42. Judgments against sovereigns in national courts are almost impossible to enforce
since there are no attachable assets outside the state's territory. See id. at 156.
43. Memorandum from Owen Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina Bondhold-
ers: Recent Argentine Legislation and Bondholder Remedies (Feb. 15, 2005),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/gcab-releases-legal-memorandum-sum-
marizing-recent-argentine-legislation-and-bondholder-remedies-54081267.html.
44. Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment Agreements,
U.N.C.T.A.D. HA Issues Norr No. 2, 3 (July 2011), http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/webdiaepcb201 1d3_en.pdf.
45. For more positive aspects of arbitration as means to settle bond disputes, see Peter
Griffin & Ania Farren, How ICSID can Protect Sovereign Bondholders, 24 INTr')
FIN. I.. Riv. 21 (2005).
46. l.C.S.I.D. Convention, art. 54, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, available at http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR-English-final.pdf.
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On the other hand, arbitrators would be empowered to review and dis-
cipline states, conveying an impression of how the state's authority influ-
ences ordinary people and the way in which they are governed.
The first step to analyze these questions, however, is to determine
whether ICSID has jurisdiction to settle sovereign bond disputes.
A. ICSID JURISDICTION OVER SOVEREIGN DEBT
In 1965, the World Bank sponsored the multilateral ICSID Conven-
tion, which created ICSID, a neutral forum for the resolution of invest-
ment disputes. 47 Thus, BITs that include ICSID clauses provide for the
submission of investor-state disputes to the ICSID Convention.48
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention defines the scope of the Centre's
jurisdiction to legal disputes arising "directly out of an investment." 49
But, no definition of this term is given.50 The Report of the Executive
Directors on the Convention on this point stated:
No attempt was made to define the term 'investment' given the es-
sential requirement of consent by the parties, and the mechanism
through which Contracting States can make known in advance, if
they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would not
consider submitting to the Centre (Article 24 (4)).51
Even though such a statement is not absolutely accurate, the absence
of a precise term is not seen as an obstacle to its use.5 2 The absence of a
definition means that the parameters of what constitutes an investment
shall be considered by the parties in the terms of the applicable BIT,
which should contain their own definition of "investment," and by the
tribunal concerned, which will ultimately settle this issue. 5 3
Therefore, a dual examination to the term "investment" in the ICSID
Convention, referred to as the 'double keyhole approach,' has become
47. MARGARET MosEs, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACI'lCE OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARImTRIATION 221 (2008).
48. Id.
49. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 46, art. 25.
50. Id.
51. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Report of the Execu-
tive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, (Apr. 2006), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR-English-final.pdf.
52. Ruoote DoLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHIREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT LAW 60 (2008).
53. Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some
Observations on Jurisdiction, 5 Coitum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 273 (1966).
Broches' account of these negotiations is relevant: "During the negotiations, sev-
eral definitions of 'investment' were considered and rejected. It was felt in the end
that a definition could be dispensed with 'given the essential requirement of con-
sent by the parties'. This indicates that the requirement that the dispute must have
arisen out of an 'investment' may be merged into the requirement of consent to
jurisdiction. Presumably, the parties' agreement that a dispute is an 'investment
dispute' will be given great weight in any determination of the Centre's jurisdic-
tion, although it would not be controlling." Id.
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the norm.54 Tribunals have to consider whether the case falls within the
scope of investment as defined in Article 25 of ICSID Convention and in
the BIT.f5
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that Article 25 places a limit
upon the parties' discretion to decide upon the meaning of investment. 5 6
Thus, even though the word 'investment' has a potentially wide scope, it
is not without restrictions.5 7
Following this rationale, the Joy Mining v. Egypt 58 tribunal stated:
The parties to a dispute cannot by contract or treaty define as invest-
ment, for the purposes of ICSID jurisdiction, something which does
not satisfy the objective requirements of Article 25 of the Conven-
tion. Otherwise Article 25 and its reliance on the concept of invest-
ment, even if not specifically defined, would be turned into a
meaningless provision.
Given this framework, a double keyhole assessment shall be made in
order to determine the jurisdiction of sovereign bonds under the ICSID
Convention.59 Thus, this next section shall assess whether there is an "in-
vestment" pursuant to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. Subse-.
quently, an analysis of relevant BIT will be carried through.
B. SOVEREIGN BONDS AS INVESTMENT UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF
ICSID CONVENTION
Defining "sovereign bonds" is essential to determine ICSID Jurisdic-
tion. As previously highlighted, sovereign bonds are by definition "debt
instruments" featuring "an obligation to pay a fixed sum of money, at a
definite time, with a stated interest."6 0 In light of this definition, are sov-
ereign bonds 'investments' under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention?
Even though there once was much controversy towards the application of
modern investment treaties to debt instruments, as Schreuer recently
stated, pure financial instruments, e.g., loans and bonds, are already being
accepted as investment.6 1 Such reasoning was confirmed by the recent
jurisdictional decision in the Abaclat case.62
Prior to the Abaclat case, there were two main cases-Fedax v. Vene-
54. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 52, at 61-62.
55. Id. at 62.
56. Id. at 70.
57. CAMPInELI. MLAnLAN FF A[,., INIRNATIONA1, INVHSrlMINT ARITRATION:
SuBsTrANTIvE PINCIPEis 164 (Loukas Mistelis et al. eds., 2007).
58. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdic-
tion, 50 (Aug. 6, 2004), 19 ICSID Rep. 468, available at http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC647_En&caseld=C229.
59. Dolzer & Scheurer, supra note 52, at 61-62.
60. Bi.ACK'S LAW DIUflONARY 200 (9th ed. 2009).
61. Christopher Schreuer, Lecture at the Arbitration Academy for International Law
in Paris: The Development of Investment Arbitration (July 5, 2011).
62. See Abaclat, ICISD Case No. ARB/07/5 (2011).
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zuela63 and CSOB v. Slovak Republic64-that applied BITs to debt
claims. In these cases, debt owed by the government was considered to be
an 'investment.' 65
Fedax v. Venezuela was the first tribunal to decide on investment ele-
ments. 66 It addressed the status of the promissory notes in three steps. 67
First, under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, it pointed out the inten-
tion of the drafters of the Convention.68 Taking into account that the
travaux prdparatoires ("preparatory work") of the ICSID Convention
listed loans, amongst other debt instruments, as possible objects of ICSID
arbitration, the tribunal decided that the requirements of an 'investment'
under Article 25 were met.6 9 Secondly, the tribunal examined consent of
the parties given under the relevant BIT clause. 70 The requirement was
also met here.7' Finally, after reviewing the characteristics of the promis-
sory note, the tribunal prepared a scheme to differentiate foreign invest-
ment from an 'ordinary commercial transaction.' 72
Such scheme was later restated in Salini v. Morocco73 and became
known as the Salini test: The doctrine generally considers that investment
infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract
and a participation in the risks of transaction. In reading the Conven-
tion's preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic develop-
ment of the host State of the investment as an additional condition.
Notwithstanding the fact that today it has been established that these
criteria constitute the definition of 'investment,' they should not be
treated as a checklist: a certain degree of flexibility must be given while
analyzing each case.74 Such was the reasoning of the tribunal in the
Abaclat award, which surprisingly decided not to use this approach at all
reasoning:
If Claimants' contributions were to fail the Salini test, those contri-
butions - according to the followers of this test - would not qualify
as investment under Article 25 ICSID Convention, which would in
turn mean that Claimants' contributions would not be given the pro-
cedural protection afforded by the ICSID Convention. The Tribunal
finds that such a result would be contradictory to the ICSID Conven-
tion's aim, which is to encourage private investment while giving the
63. Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1997).
64. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
97/4 (1999), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.
65. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM
THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAi TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAw 386 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
66. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 65- 66.






73. Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 42 I.L.M. 609, 622 (2001).
74. See Abaclat, ICISD Case No. ARB/07/5.
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Parties the tools to further define what kind of investment they want
to promote. It would further make no sense in view of Argentina's
and Italy's express agreement to protect the value generated by
these kinds of contributions. In other words - and from the value
perspective - there would be an investment, which Argentina and
Italy wanted to protect and to submit to ICSID arbitration, but it
could not be given any protection because - from the perspective of
the contribution - the investment does not meet certain criteria.
Considering that these criteria were never included in the ICSID
Convention, while being controversial and having been applied by
tribunals in varying manners and degrees, the Tribunal does not see
any merit in following and copying the Salini criteria. The Salini cri-
teria may be useful to further describe what characteristics contribu-
tions may or should have. They should, however, not serve to create
a limit, which the Convention itself nor the Contracting Parties to a
specific BIT intended to create.75
In this respect, the approach undertaken by the tribunal was to analyze
the characteristic of significant contribution, which could possibly offer
difficulties to the application of modern investment treaties to financial
instruments. 76 Such criteria, however, is not a construction of the Salini
tribunal, but a determination embedded in the preamble of the ICSID
Convention, which stresses "the need for international co-operation for
economic development and the role of private international investment
therein."77
In this context, the Abaclat tribunal analyzed whether the contributions
made by the Claimants led to the creation of the value that is protected
under the Italy-Argentina BIT.78 The tribunal argued:
[T]here is no doubt that Claimants made a contribution: They pur-
chased security entitlements in the bonds and thus, paid a certain
amount of money in exchange of the security entitlements. The
value generated by this contribution is the right attached to the se-
curity entitlements to claim reimbursement from Argentina of the
principal amount and the interests accrued.79
Consequently, the tribunal decided that the purchase of the security
entitlements in the bonds qualified as 'investment' under Article 25 of the
Convention.80
Fedax v. Venezuela also relied heavily on the abstract contribution of
promissory notes to Venezuelan treasury:
The important question is whether the funds made available are uti-
lized by the beneficiary of the credit, as in the case of the Republic of
Venezuela, so as to finance it various governmental needs. It is not
75. Id. at 142.
76. See id.
77. I.C.S.I.D. Convention, supra note 46, pmbl.
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disputed that in this case that the Republic of Venezuela, by means
of the promissory notes, received an amount of credit that was put to
work during a period of time for its financial needs.8'
Thus, the tribunal stated that the promissory notes contributed to Ven-
ezuelan treasury, pursuant to the Law of Public Credit, which, in turn,
contributed to the host state's development:
The promissory notes were issued by the Republic of Venezuela
under the terms of the Law of Public Credit (the Law), which specifi-
cally governs public credit operations aimed at raising funds and re-
sources "to undertake productive works, attend to the need of
national interest and cover transitory needs of the treasury." 82
It is important to note that even though the requirement of significant
contribution is subject to some disagreement, as long as the investment
was lawfully admitted and implemented, the fact that it is coherent with
the legal order of the host state should already mean that it contributes to
its development.83
C. Sovereign Bonds as Investment Under BITS
As previously mentioned, when a jurisdictional objection is made re-
garding the existence of an "investment," tribunals examine the notion of
"investment" under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and under the
scope of consent given by the host state in light of the provision in the
investment treaties.84
Multilateral treaties, such as the Energy Charter Treaty,85 typically de-
fine the term "investment" along the lines of BITs. Most BITs adopt an
asset-based formula to define the term "investment." 8 6 They commonly
contain a general inclusive phrase, followed by a non-exhaustive list that
usually illustrates five categories of assets.87 This finite and comprehen-
sive definition of assets accounts for the fact that investments develop
81. Fedax N.Y., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. at 1386.
82. Id. at 1386-1387.
83. DoiZiR & SciumuIA, supra note 52, at 69.
84. Id. at 61.
85. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 1(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 (defining the
term "investment").
86. DoLzE-R & SCIIEUER, supra note 52, at 61.
87. Securing High Investment Protection for EU Investors: A Review of Member States'
Model BITs 14 (2011), KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM NAT'L BOARD oF TRADE., http://
www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/In%20English/New%20reports/Report%20
Securing%20high%20investment%20protection%20for%20EU%20investors.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2011) (explaining that the five categories typically included are:
"1) Movable and immovable property and any related property rights such as
mortgages, liens or pledges; 2) Various types of interests in companies, such as
shares, stock, bonds, debentures or any other form of participation in a company,
business enterprise or joint venture; 3) Claims to money and claims under a con-
tract having a financial value and loans directly related to a specific investment; 4)
Intellectual property rights; and 5) Business concessions (i.e. rights conferred by
law or under contracts)").
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over time, providing a high level of protection for the investor.8 8 Not-
withstanding the usual explicit inclusion of bonds as a protected asset
under BITs,89 some lists implicitly include sovereign bonds.
For instance, the Argentina-Australia BIT definition of investment ex-
plicitly includes bonds (in the official English version), or "bonus" (in the
official Spanish version), in its list:
"For the purposes of this Agreement: (a) 'investment' means ... (ii)
shares, stocks, bonds and debentures and any other form of participation
in a company or legal person."90
"A los fines del presente Acuerdo: (a) 'inversi6n' designa . .. (ii) ac-
ciones, titulos, bonos y obligaciones y cualquier otro tipo de participaci6n
en una sociedad o persona jurfdica." 91
It is now important to scrutinize more closely whether the present
bondholders' dispute meets the feature of an investment under the Ar-
gentina-Italy BIT.9 2 The BIT states the following: "[For the purposes of
this Agreement, the term] investment includes, without limitation . . . (c)
obligations, private or public titles or any other right to performances or
services having economic value, including capitalized revenues."9 3
"A los fines del presente Acuerdo: 1. El t6rmino "inversin" designa
(.. .): c) obligaciones, titulos pdblicos o privados o cualquier otro derecho
a prestaciones o servicios que tengan un valor econ6mico, como tambi6n
las ganancias capitalizadas." 9 4
88. See Doiz ii & Scinuiai, supra note 52, at 61.
89. See, e.g., Canadian Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments (Model FIPA), CANADA: TRADE Ni;OTATIONS AND) AouI MENiTs, art. 1
(2004), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/as-
sets/pdfs/2004-fipa-model-en.pdf; United States Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, U.S. DiPr. oF STAT ., art. 1 (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organ-
ization/117601.pdf; Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Austria-Mex., art. 1(2)(c), June 29,1998,9 INV. PROMOTION & PROTi CTiION TREA-
TjIs (Int'l Ctr. For Settlement Inv. Disputes), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
Investment/B ITSbyCountry/BITs/M EXAustria e.asp; Agreement Concerning
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Den.-India, art. 1(1)(ii),
Sept. 6, 1995, 7 INv. PRoMOTION & PRoTECTIoN TiniAis (Int'l Ctr. For Settle-
ment Inv. Disputes), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/
denmark-india.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2011); Agreement Between Australia and
the Czech Republic on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
art. 1(1)(a)(ii), Sept. 30, 1993, [1994] ATS 18, available at http://www.austlii.edu.aul
aulother/dfat/treaties/1994/18.html; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
of Investment, Arg.-Can., art. 1(a), Nov. 5, 1991, 1993 Can. T.S. No. 11.
90. Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Ar-
gentine Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, and Protocol,
art. 1(a), Aug. 23, 1995, [1997] ATS 4, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/aul
other/dfat/treaties/ATS/1 997/4.html.
91. Id., available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina
australia.sp.pdf (Spanish version).
92. Sulla Promozione e Protezione Degli Investimenti [On the Protection and Promo-
tion of Investments], Arg.-Itl., May 22, 1990, 3 INv. PROMOTION & PRoimeniON
TimA'ins (Int'l Ctr. For Settlement Inv. Disputes), available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/italy-argentina-it.pdf.
93. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 352.
94. Spanish translation.
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As demonstrated, the coverage in this BIT is extended to "obliga-
ciones," as delineated in the official Spanish version, and does not men-
tion specifically the term 'bonus' or 'bonds.'95
In light of this evidence, the Argentine government contested ICSID
jurisdiction based on the argument that bonds are not covered in the
BIT.96 But, such interpretation did not succeed.97
By definition, the term "obligation," or "obligaciones," is a "legal re-
sponsibility, as for a debt."98 A debt, on the other hand, is a "general
name for bonds, notes, mortgages, and other forms of paper evidencing
amounts owed and payable on specified dates or on demand." 99 Hence,
even though broad, the term "obligaciones" gives coverage to bonds.
In these terms, the tribunal in the Abaclat case stated:
Secondly, lit. (c) specifically addresses financial instruments. It is
true that the term "obligations" is a broad term and can refer to any
kind of contractual obligation, i.e., debt, and it is also true that the
term "title" is also very broad. However, put in the context of the
further terms listed in lit. (c) such as "economic value" or "capital-
ized revenue," as well as considering that lit. (f) already deals with
the more general concept of "any right of economic nature," lit. (c) is
to be read as referring to the financial meaning of these terms. Thus,
the term "obligation" may be understood as referring to an eco-
nomic value incorporated into a credit title representing a loan. This
kind of obligations [sic] would in the English language more com-
monly be called "bond," rather than "obligation."100
Such understanding was also observed in Fedax v. Venezuela: "Ac-
cording to the underlying BIT, the phrasing 'every asset' justifies a broad
interpretation and that in addition '[. . .] this interpretation is also consis-
tent with the broad reach that the term 'investment' must be given in light
of the negotiating history of the Convention.'("1
Further, in CSOB v. Slovakia, the tribunal decided that although the
term loans were not explicitly mentioned in the Czech Republic-Slovakia
BIT, broad terms such as "assets" and "monetary receivables or claims"
clearly encompass loans given to the Slovak government. 102 Hence, the
jurisdiction to claim was accepted.103
95. See id.
96. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 100, 102.
97. Id. 1 501.
98. JoHN DOWNES & JORDAN Eui lo GOODMAN, BARRON's Dic-IONARY oF Fi-
NANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 379 (4th ed. 1995) (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 127.
100. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 1 355.
101. OiRG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERAToN AN) DE~v., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
UNDERSTANDING CONCEPT-S ANiD TRACKING INNOVATIONs 67 (2008).
102. Id. at 68.
103. Id. at 69.
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D. OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION OVER SOVEREIGN BONDS
1. Contract Claims versus Treaty Claims
With the notable exception of Brazil,104 sovereign bond contracts are
usually governed by municipal law.'05 International law only comes into
sight on a sovereign bond dispute when the bondholder alleges a breach
of an international obligation set in a BIT based on the acts of a
sovereign. 106
In the Abaclat case, it is unquestionable that Argentina has not per-
formed its contractual obligations under the issued bonds. 0 7 Therefore,
Argentina may or may not be held liable for the breach of the obligations
set therein.108 But, it is relevant to the ICSID tribunal that Argentina
does not justify the enactment of Law n. 26017 due to a contractual right
such as a force majeure clause. 09 On the contrary, Argentina bases its
defense on its financial situation and state of insolvency at the end of
2001, which has nothing to do with any contractual right.' 10 Thus, what
Argentina did was use its sovereign power to promulgate a law that enti-
tled it to not perform its obligations."'1 In the words of the Abaclat
tribunal:
[T]hc present dispute does not derive from the mere fact that Argen-
tina failed to perform its payment obligations under the bonds but
from the fact that it intervened as a sovereign by virtue of its State
power to modify its payment obligations towards its creditors in gen-
eral, encompassing but not limited to the Claimants. 1 12
In such case, as confirmed by the Abaclat tribunal, the ICSID enjoys
concurrent jurisdiction with the competent organ-be it a court or an ar-
bitral tribunal-to solve such a dispute.1 3 There is nothing unusual in
this overlap of claims because the legal basis on which the claims rely are
different.1 14
2. Bond's Collective Action Clauses (CACs) and their Relationship
with Treaty Claims
Furthermore, an important issue that has come to light with the spread
of CACs, which have now been identified in more than 90 percent of the
recently issued bonds,' "5 is whether they can bar recourse to ICSID arbi-
104. See Cross, supra note 11, at 341-43; Waibel, supra note 7, at 732 n.131. Brazilian
bonds incorporate UNCITRAL arbitration clauses. The reasons for such incorpo-
ration, however, are historic. See Cross, supra note 11, at 335.
105. See Cross, supra note 11, at 341-43; Waibel, supra note 7, at 732.
106. See Cross, supra note 11, at 345.
107. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 320.
108. See id.
109. Id. 911 320-21.
110. Id. 91 321.
111. Id. 9 323.
112. Id. at 91 324.
113. See id. 9191 316-17.
114. See id. 318.
115. UNCTAD, supra note 26, at 6.
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tration.116 Some submit that where a majority of bondholders have de-
cided on the restructuring of the debt, holdout creditors will not be
allowed to allege a treaty breach of an international obligation under the
BIT.117 Such claims would not be possible since the contractual rights
once held by the dissenting creditors were modified by the new terms of
restructuring."1 8
But, the acts of the creditors are based on a contractual framework and
do not concern the acts of a sovereign. Consequently, despite the change
in the contractual rights of the bondholders, the treatment standards that
should be offered to investors and their investments do not change. As
will be seen in the next section, if standards of protection, such as fair and
equitable treatment and expropriation without compensation are
breached, the state's responsibility to compensate will be triggered, de-
spite the presence of CACs in the bonds." 9
Many complications may arise from such a procedure. 120 The use of
ICSID arbitration could undermine the restructuring procedure, incen-
tivizing creditors not to adhere to the debt restructuring; as a result, the
seventy-five percent threshold required to bind all holders with the same
bond would not be met.121 Further, dissenting creditors could be
awarded compensation that would not be conferred to the supermajority
bondholders, creating an apparent breach of the pari passu clausesl 22
provided for in the bond contracts.123
On the other hand, with the absence of a statutory framework to deal
with sovereign bankruptcy, there is a growing issue as to whether ICSID
arbitration and investment arbitration in general could become valuable
assets in the debt restructuring procedure used to solve related dis-
putes.124 This dilemma has been dealt with in section five.
In light of the above analysis, a possible solution for countries wishing
to avoid liability in cases concerning public debt is to explicitly include
guidelines in the investment treaties concerning the interaction between
116. It is important to note that this matter does not pertain to the Italian bondholder
case since the sovereign bond contracts in question do not provide for CACs.
117. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 736.
118. See id. at 736-37; see also Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Invest-
ment Agreements, supra note 44, at 6.
119. See JI-swAo W. SALACUSE, TiL LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIs 205 (2010).
120. See, e.g., Waibel, supra note 7 at 736.
121. Id. at 713, 736.
122. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments: A Complex Quest, 43 INT') LAw. 1217, 1226 (2009) (defining "pari
passu" as "refer[ring] to things that are in the same situation [or] that rank
equally"). According to Francis B. Palmer, "'[t]here is no special virtue in the
words 'pari passu', 'equally' would have the same effect or any other words show-
ing that the [bonds] were intended to stand on the same level footing without
preference or priority among themselves."' Id. (quoting FRANCIs B. Palmer,
Company Precedents: For Use in Relation to Companies Subject to the Companies
Act, 1862-1890: With Copious Notes and an Appendix Containing Acts and Rules
109-10 (8th ed. 1902)).
123. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 715.
124. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 11, at 337.
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sovereign debt restructuring and those treaties. 12 5 Such a provision was
stated in Annex 10-A of the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States of America Free Trade Agreement:
The rescheduling of the debts of a Central American Party or the
Dominican Republic, or of such Party's institutions owned or con-
trolled through ownership interests by such Party, owed to the
United States and the rescheduling of any of such Party's debts owed
to creditors in general are not subject to any provision of Section A
other than Articles 10.3 [National Treatment] and 10.4 [Most Fa-
vored Nation Treatment].126
These provisions can be seen as a step towards recognizing the need to
implement a special mechanism for the payment of debt when states are
facing financial and economic crises.
Once ICSID jurisdiction has been accepted, demonstrating a breach of
the BIT standards of protection is the next step to triggering the responsi-
bility of the state under international law.1 27 The next section examines
the standards of protection most frequently sought to trigger state re-
sponsibility and analyzes necessity as a possible justification for interna-
tional wrongful conduct.
IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER SOVEREIGN
DEBT CRISES
The Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (ILC Articles), adopted by the International Law Commission in
2001, set the basic rules of state responsibility for its internationally
wrongful acts. 128 Article 2 states that for responsibility to be attributed to
the State, the wrongful act must constitute a violation of an international
obligation of the State.129 The term "international obligation" encom-
passes both treaty and non-treaty obligations. 30 In light of this defini-
tion, a breach of an obligation set in an investment treaty will trigger state
responsibility. 13 '
Taking into account the need to protect foreign investors against the
risk of placing their assets under the jurisdiction of a host state, invest-
ment treaties include treatment obligations designed to protect investors
125. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-




127. Waibel, supra note 7, at 738-39.
128. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, art. 1, in Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
53d Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
129. Id. art. 2.
130. Id. art. 2 commentary 1 7.
131. Id.
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from the interference or regulation of their investments by host states.132
Although treaties do not typically define "treatment," arbitral tribunals
have defined the term as follows: [T]he ordinary meaning of that term
within the context of investment includes the rights and privileges
granted and the obligations and burdens imposed by a Contracting State
on investments made by investors covered by the treaty.133
The application of the treatment standards establishes the precise im-
pact of the treaty: by interpreting the standards, arbitrators can deter-
mine the scope of the sovereign power and decide whether and how
public authority may be used to limit the investors' actions.134
Given this framework, an important issue to be analyzed is whether
defaults on sovereign bonds or sovereign debt restructurings breach
treaty obligations and, thus, trigger state responsibility.135 Even further,
in the Argentine context, one should analyze whether governmental mea-
sures taken as a response to a financial crisis are exempt from treaty
obligations.136
This section prima facie analyzes two of the most important and fre-
quently sought standards of protection in BITs: a) fair and equitable
treatment; and b) expropriation.13 7 Subsequently, the article analyzes
whether the concept of necessity, as defined in the ILC Articles, can be
invoked as a justification for the suspension of payment by the Argentine
government of its external bonds.
A. STANDARDS OF TREATMENT
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) is the most important standard of
protection in investment disputes. 138 It is frequently invoked by investors
and is nearly always accepted.139 Most investment protection treaties
contain a reference to FET.140 For instance, article 2.1I.a of the BIT be-
tween the United States and Argentina states: "Investment shall at all
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment."141
The definition of FET is rather imprecise.14 2 Therefore, tribunals have
132. SALACUSE, supra note 119, at 205.
133. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v.
The Argentine Republic [2006] ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19
134. SALACUSE, supra note 119, at 205-07.
135. Waibel, supra note 7, at 738.
136. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/07, T 320.
137. Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WoRLo
INV. & TRADE no. 3, at 356, 373 (2005).
138. Id. at 373-74.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Treaty between United States of America and Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (Signed Nov. 14, 1991;
Entered into Force Oct. 20, 1994) http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
argentina-us.pdf.
142. Schreuer, supra note 137, at 385.
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made many attempts to give a more specific meaning to the standard.143
One of the most complete and often cited definitions was set forth by the
tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico:
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agree-
ment, in light of the good faith principle established by international
law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international in-
vestments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that
were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the invest-
ment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consis-
tent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand
any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as
well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices
or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such
regulations . . . The foreign investor also expects the host state to act
consistently .... The investor also expects the State to use the legal
instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the investment
in conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments,
and not to deprive the investor of its investment without the required
compensation. 14 4
In spite of this lack of a precise definition, the vast case law rendered
over the years has made it possible to identify particular circumstances
where the FET standard has been applied. 145 Therefore, an analysis of
the FET concept in light of the typical factual situations leads to a group
of more concrete principles that are protected under the broad FET stan-
dard.14 6 As identified by Schreuer, such principles include: "transparency
and the protection of the investor's legitimate expectations; freedom
from coercion and harassment; procedural propriety and due process; and
good faith." 47
But, it is not clear whether the reliance on contractual undertakings is
one of the factual situations protected by the FET concept. 14 8 The deci-
sions on this matter are not definite. 14 9 The tribunal in Mondev v. United
States suggested that contractual obligations were protected under
NAFTA Article 1105 (5), which states, "[i]ndeed a governmental prerog-
ative to violate investment contracts would appear to be inconsistent with
the principles embodied in Article 1105 and with contemporary standards
of national and international law concerning governmental liability for
contractual performance." 50 This position was also upheld by the tribu-
143. Id.
144. T6cnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/
2, Award, 57 (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 134 (2006) (emphasis added).
145. Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WoiuI)
INv. & TRAD' no. 3, at 356, 373 (2005).
146. Id. at 373-74.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 379.
149. Id.
150. Mondev Int'l Ltd. V. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 1 134
(Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004).
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nal in SGS v. Philippines'5'
Some tribunals have embraced a restrictive approach, stating that a
simple breach of contract would not amount to a violation of the FET
standard, provided that the state did not exercise its sovereign power to
repudiate the contract.152 Such a position was sustained by the Waste
Management v. Mexico tribunal: "[E]ven the persistent non-payment of
debts by a municipality is not to be equated with a violation of Article
1105, provided that it does not amount to an outright and unjustified re-
pudiation of the transaction and provided that some remedy is open to
the creditor to address the problem."' 53
In Vivendi v. Argentina, the tribunal suggested that "'mere' breaches of
contract" would not amount to a breach of the FET standard.154
Schreuer goes even further by stating that when the breach of contract
results from financial difficulties, a breach of the FET standard cannot be
invoked.'55
These controversial decisions indicate that, in order to determine the
applicability of the FET standard to contract claims, it is imperative that
tribunals balance the interests of the investors with the governmental
acts.156 Thus, an analysis of whether the host state's interference with the
investor's rights is arbitrary or a legitimate response to a situation of gen-
uine difficulty will need to be undertaken. 57
In the Italian bondholder cases, Argentina's default possibly goes be-
yond a mere breach of contract.s58 By prohibiting the reopening of the
restructuring process, Law n. 26017 definitely hinders investors' contrac-
tual rights.' 59 On the other hand, if Schreuer's postulate is correct and a
country's default cannot be invoked as a breach of the FET standard,
then the implementation of the debt restructuring process could be
invoked.160
Given this framework, brief interpretations of the specific FET princi-
ples shall be made regarding this subject matter.
a. Transparency and Protection of the Investor's Legitimate
Expectations
Transparency and the protection of the investor's legitimate expecta-
151. See Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, 91 166 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518
(2005).
152. See Waste Management, Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 1
115 (Apr. 30, 2004), 11 ICSID Rep. 362 (2007); see also Waibel, supra note 7, at
751.
153. Waste Management, Inc., supra note 152, at 115.
154. Compafifa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Deci-
sion on Annulment, 1 101 n.73, (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 340 (2004).
155. See Schreuer, supra note 145, at 380.
156. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 759.
157. See id. at 746-47, 759.
158. Id. at 746.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 751.
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tions often overlap and blend into one another.161 Transparency means
that the legal framework affecting the investor's investment and decisions
is easily perceived. 162 This does not mean that the government cannot
change its laws. What matters is that the basic legal framework offered to
the investor is not undermined. 163
The investor's legitimate expectations emerge from the legal frame-
work of the host state at the time the investment is acquired.164 Thus, if
the state creates certain expectations through its legislation (leading the
contracting party to invest), and then reverses such assurances, a viola-
tion of the principle of FET results.165
In the Italian bondholders' case, the restructuring of the debt should
not be the main transparency issue because Argentina has restructured its
sovereign debt many times. 166 Therefore, there should not be a major
concern about legitimate expectations there. 67 But, with Law n. 26017,
the legal status quo changes significantly. 16 8 As described by Owen Pell,
"the Exchange Offer does not preclude amendment, extension, or future
offers, and the Most Favored Creditor clause appears to allow for side or
other future settlements with Bondholders above the levels offered in the
Exchange Offer."' 69 Thus, by abrogating rights to non-participating
bondholders, the violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard
seems clear.170
b. Freedom from Coercion and Harassment
A confrontational and aggressive exchange offer could potentially be
seen as a violation of the FET standard.17' In Tecmed v. Mexico there
was a replacement of an unlimited license with a limited license for the
operation of landfill.172 The tribunal pointed out that such a permit de-
nial would force the investor to relocate to another site at its own ex-
pense: under such circumstances, such pressure involves forms of
coercion that may be considered inconsistent with the fair and equitable
treatment to be given to international investments under Article 4(1) of
the Agreement and objectionable from the perspective of international
law.17
Such a rationale may be employed to analyze the recent Argentine case
161. Schreuer, supra note 145, at 374.
162. Id.; see also Waibel, supra note 7, at 752.
163. See Schreuer, supra note 145, at 374.
164. Id.
165. Id.; SALAcusF, supra note 119, at 231.
166. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 752.
167. Id.
168. Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to Global Committee of Argentina Bondhold-
ers, supra note 13.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 752.
172. T&nicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
$ 57.
173. Id. 1 163.
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and the real motivation of Law n. 26017.174 Was its primary objective to
serve as a commitment device, or to coerce holdout creditors to partici-
pate in the exchange offer?
c. Procedural Propriety and Due Process
As emphasized by many scholars, 75 a fair procedure by the host state
is a crucial prerequisite of the rule of law and a fundamental element of
the FET standard. The bondholders may argue in this case that there
were serious procedural shortcomings in the exchange offer because the
Argentine government did not negotiate with the creditors and did not
leave the holdout creditors any choice but to agree with the new terms of
the bond.176
As noted by the UNCTAD, it is not possible to conduct efficient nego-
tiations with the thousands, sometimes even hundreds of thousands of
creditors.' 77 Thus, the government expects a majority of its creditors to
accept when it makes an exchange offer.178 Although such negotiations
may in fact be impossible, the bondholders had to be conferred an option
as to whether they wanted to agree with the new terms or not. 7 9 As
previously noted, such an option was not given.180
d. Good Faith
Finally, if the actions of the host state are taken in bad faith, then a
violation of the FET standard occurs.' 81 The notion of bad faith, how-
ever, is not essential to ascertain whether there was a violation of the
FET standard.' 82 This was the position of the arbitral tribunal in Mondev
v. United States: "[W]hat is unfair or inequitable need not to equate with
the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign
investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad
faith."183
Determining whether the Argentine government acted in bad faith re-
quires a thorough knowledge of the economic situation of Argentina and
its payment capacity. 18 4 The bondholders then must demonstrate that the
debt restructuring procedure was elaborated due to the governments' un-
willingness to pay.185 Taking into account the promulgation of Law n.
174. Waibel, supra note 7, at 752.
175. See DoLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 142; SALACUSE, supra note 119, at
241.
176. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 752.
177. Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment Agreements, supra note
44, at 5.
178. Id.
179. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 752.
180. See id.
181. SALACUSE, supra note 119, at 243.
182. Schreuer, supra note 145, at 385.
183. Mondev Int'l Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 1 116.
184. See Waibel, supra note 7, at 753.
185. Id.
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26017, the bondholders also must demonstrate that the government in-
tended to annul the non-participating bondholders' rights.18 6
Notwithstanding those probable violations, the notion of bad faith is
difficult to prove because a government can always offer a public policy
justification for its actions.'8 7 Also, the arbitral tribunal is put in a very
delicate position and possibly would not desire to give a decision against
the state in such terms, when other violations of the FET principles could
be used instead. 88
2. Expropriation
One of the main concerns for foreigners in general (and for foreign
investors) has been the international rules on expropriation.' 89 Expropri-
ation is one of the most serious ways to obstruct the use of property,
because seizing an investment without compensation destroys all investor
expectations.190 Thus, it became a classical substantive standard of pro-
tection and is sometimes seen as synonymous to investor protection.
a. The Scope of Expropriation
The definition of investment in the BITs with host states will define the
scope of protection given to investors against expropriation.' 9 ' Such pro-
tection is usually extended to tangible and intangible rights, thus includ-
ing contractual rights.192 Because contracts outline the legal and financial
structure of the investment, practically all investment treaties support the
idea that rights arising from a contract are susceptible to expropriation
and are, consequently, covered by the term "investment." 93
This was the position adopted in Siemens A. G. v. Argentine Republic
while employing the German and Argentine BIT:
The Contract falls under the definition of "investments" under the
Treaty and Article 4(2) refers to expropriation or nationalization of
investments. Therefore, the State parties recognized that an invest-
ment in terms of the Treaty may be expropriated. There is nothing
unusual in this regard. There is a long judicial practice that recog-
nizes that expropriation is not limited to tangible property.194
186. See id.
187. SALACUSI, supra note 119, at 243.
188. Id.
189. Dot zEiR & Sanumnit, supra note 52, at 89.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 90.
192. See id. at 116-17.
193. Id.
194. Siemens A. G. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 9 267 (Feb. 6, 2007), 14
ICSID Rep. 518 (2009); see also Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S. v.
Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 255 (Nov. 14, 2005),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases
RH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=ViewAllCases (follow link labeled "click here
for advanced search options," type "Bayindir" in the "Claimant" box, and click
"Search." Then, click on "ARB/03/29." Select the "Decisions and Awards" tab.
Then, click on "English (Original)") (not yet reported in ICSID Rep.); Consor-
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Regardless, in the aftermath of a financial crisis, where a state defaults
on sovereign bond contracts or restructures its debt, direct or indirect
expropriationl 9 5 could be invoked as a result of such actions. But, be-
cause BITs do not specifically address whether defaults and debt restruc-
turings constitute expropriation, it is unclear whether sovereign bonds are
qualified as contractual rights subject to expropriation.
There are different views regarding the possibility of expropriation of
sovereign bonds. As highlighted by Waibel,196 some scholars, such as
Feilchenfeld, confirmed such protection. On the other hand, scholars
such as Borchard associate bonds with commercial undertakings.' 9 7 In
this way, the contractual obligation arising out of the bond would be of a
commercial nature, and not of an investment nature.198 Therefore, arbi-
tral tribunals should reject jurisdiction over bond disputes.' 99 But, having
already established the investment nature of the bond dispute, it seems
unlikely that such position will be undertaken by the arbitral tribunal in
the Italian bondholder case.
b. Requirements for Expropriation
In harmony with the concept of territorial sovereignty, it has been ac-
cepted that expropriation of investors' assets by a host state is not illegal
if certain conditions are met.2 0 0 Hence, investment treaties address the
conditions and consequences of such action but do not affect the right to
expropriate. 201
There are four basic requirements in international law for a lawful ex-
propriation to occur: a) the measure must serve a public purpose; b) the
measure must be non-discriminatory; c) the procedure should follow due
process; and d) full, adequate and effective compensation shall be
given.202
tium RFCC v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Sentence of Arbitration, $ 60
(Dec. 22, 2003), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=ViewAllCases (follow link labeled
"click here for advanced search options," type "Consortium" in the "Claimant"
box and "Morocco" in the "Respondent" box, and click "Search." Then, click on
"ARB/00/6." Select the "Decisions and Awards" tab. Then, click on "French
(Original)" next to "Award (December 22, 2003).") (not yet reported in ICSID
Rep.).
195. The difference between direct and indirect expropriation lies on whether the legal
title of the investor is affected by the measure. Under direct expropriation, the
title is taken away, and under indirect expropriation, the title continues with the
investor. Direct expropriations have become rare, while indirect expropriations
have gained prominence. DOllER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 92.
196. Waibel, supra note 7, at 744.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Edwin M. Borchard, Contractual Claims in International Law, 13 COLUM. L. Rrv.
457, 494 (1913).
200. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 89.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 90-91.
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Compensation is the most controversial of these requirements. 203 Ex-
propriation that is fully compensated likely will not be contested.
Compensation must be full, adequate, and effective. 204 Adequate com-
pensation is usually understood as the full market value of the expropri-
ated investment at the time of the taking.205 But, such amount of
compensation is difficult to determine, especially when a debt restructur-
ing takes place.206 In such a case, what should be the appropriate com-
pensation given to the holdout creditors? Should the original value of the
bond be taken into account, or the value agreed upon by the other bond-
holders in the new exchange offer? The position of the arbitral tribunal
will determine the effectiveness of future exchange offers because bond-
holders may be tempted not participate in the exchange offers, therefore
making it difficult to achieve the required threshold to consider debt re-
structuring of successful countries.207
Another important question is whether the legal duty to compensate
for internationally wrongful acts remains in effect when the necessity de-
fense is invoked.208 On this matter, Article 27 of the ILC Articles is very
clear:
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accor-
dance with this chapter is without prejudice to: (a) compliance with
the obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance
precluding wrongfulness no longer exists; (b) the question of com-
pensation for any material loss caused by the act in question. 209
Therefore, because there is no rationale for the host state to take ad-
vantage of the plea of necessity and for the investor to suffer the costs,
compensation should be given as soon as the emergency situation ceases
to exist.2 1 0 The tribunal adopted a similar understanding in CMS v. Ar-
gentina: "Even if the plea of necessity were accepted, compliance with the
obligation would reemerge as soon as the circumstance precluding wrong-
fulness no longer existed." 211
Such decision was also adopted by the Tribunal in Enron v. Argen-
tina.212 On the other hand, the LG&E v. Argentina tribunal decided that
Argentina should only be held liable for the decisions it took before and




207. See generally Jose Garcia-Hamilton Jr. et al., The Required Threshold to Restruc-
ture Sovereign Debt, 27 Loy. L.A. INT' & Comi. L. Rjiv. 249, 251 (2005).
208. See Doj.nui'i & Sci stiz, supra note 52, at 91.
209. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, art. 27, in Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
53d Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
210. See Doi.,zini & Scniiiai, supra note 52, at 170.
211. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8, Award, 9 382
(May 12, 2005), 14 ICSID Rep. 158 (2009).
212. Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, $ 321, 339 (May 22, 2007).
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after the state of emergency had ceased to exist.2 13
c. Effect of the measure
The effect of the measure over the investment is another relevant ele-
ment in determining the existence of an expropriation requiring compen-
sation. Whenever such effect is extensive, lasts for a considerable
duration of time and is driven by intent, it will be assumed that a seizure
of the investment has happened. 2 14
In light of these requirements, the "mere non-performance" of contrac-
tual obligations is not considered by case law as expropriation. Other
elements need to be present.2 15 The arbitral tribunal in Waste Manage-
ment v. Mexico, for instance, decided that the failure to pay the fees by
the City of Acapulco under a concession contract was not equivalent to
expropriation. The tribunal reasoned: "The mere non-performance of a
contractual obligation is not to be equated with a taking of property, nor
(unless accompanied by other elements) is tantamount to expropriation.
Any private party can fail to perform its contracts, whereas nationaliza-
tion and expropriation are inherently governmental acts." 2 1 6
As Schreuer noted, "the context suggests that the Tribunal's point was
that mere non-payment of a debt does not constitute an expropriation ...
[I]t is also possible that what the Tribunal meant was simply that there
had to be some positive action rather than a mere omission." 217 In this
sense, for expropriation to take place, intent is required.218 The City of
Acapulco, however, found itself in a situation of genuine difficulty, and
thus did not act in an arbitrary manner.
Nevertheless, the condition of "mere non-performance" does not apply
to the debt restructuring in Argentina. 219 Firstly, Law n. 26017, which
forbade the reopening of the exchange offer and any negotiations with
creditors that refused to participate in the restructuring process, is cer-
tainly a state act that interferes with existing contractual rights. 220
But, it is always important to differentiate whether the measures were
taken to enhance the exchange offer or to coerce holdout creditors to
accept the bond exchange. 221 It is apparent that Law n. 26017 is discrimi-
natory against holdout creditors and coercive.222 As a result, such re-
213. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E Int'l Inc. v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, T 228-29 (Oct. 3, 2006).
214. SALACUSE, supra note 119, at 308.
215. MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVERFIGN DEFAUi TS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TaImuNAt-s 282 (2011).
216. Waste Management, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 1 174.
217. Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Expropriation Under the ETC and Other In-
vestment Protection Treaties, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND TnE ENERGY
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structuring method will trigger the states' international liability to
compensate. 223
Furthermore, as discussed in the Memorandum from Owen Pell to the
GCAB in February 2005, "Recent Argentine Legislation and Bondhold-
ers Remedies" ("GCAB Memorandum"), Argentina defaulted on its
debt in 2001.224 But, even though by 2005 some individual creditors had
received favorable judgments in U.S. federal court, they had "little suc-
cess in locating, and no success in attaching or executing on, any Argen-
tine assets." 225
Thus, as mentioned, the duration of the measure is also an important
feature for the assessment of the existence of expropriation. A similar
understanding was stated in LG&E v. Argentine Republic:
Similarly, one must consider the duration of the measure as it relates
to the degree of interference with the investor's ownership rights.
Generally, the expropriation must be permanent, that is to say, it
cannot have a temporary nature, unless the investment's successful
development depends on the realization of certain activities at spe-
cific moments that may not endure variations.226
In spite of the coercive measures taken by governments, recent deci-
sions have tried to find a balance between the right of protection of the
investors' investment and the right of host states to take actions that are
excused under the customary international doctrine of necessity.
B. THE PLEA OF NECESSITY
The term "necessity" (6tat de necessitd) is used to indicate extraordi-
nary conditions in which the only way for a state to preserve its essential
interests endangered by grave and imminent peril is not to comply with
its international obligations. 227 Such plea precludes international wrong-
ful acts perpetrated by the state. 228
In the past, this claim was connected to the idea of self-preservation. 229
Thus, when there was an imminent threat to self-preservation, any lawful
or even unlawful action could be taken in order to protect the endan-
gered right.2 3 0 Hugo Grotius stated that such right was applicable not
only to individuals, but also to inter-state relations.231 In this way, Gro-
tius set the nineteenth century understanding that States possessed cer-
tain fundamental rights, which included the right to existence and the
223. Id.
224. Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to Global Committee of Argentina Bondhold-
ers, supra note 13.
225. Id.
226. LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 9 193.
227. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 128, at 80.
228. Id.
229. Roman Boed, State of Necessity As A Justification for Internationally Wrongful
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right to self-preservation. 232
But, by understanding that self-preservation was a right many problems
were created because one would need to balance which opposing rights
were more important. Thus, contemporary law has ended such dilemma
by dispensing the notion of a right and acknowledging that self-preserva-
tion and other interests of the state could be used as an excuse to noncom-
pliance of international obligations under certain circumstances. 233
Such excuses were not left unfettered. At the request of the ILC, Pro-
fessor Robert Ago, who was appointed judge of the International Court
of Justice ('ICJ'), prepared a study of the defense of necessity in interna-
tional law,2 3 4 which culminated in its codification as Article 25 of the ILC
Articles. The Article states that the necessity defense requires "grave
and imminent peril;" that the action was the "only way" to safeguard an
essential interest; and that the state has not "contributed to the state of
necessity. "235
Necessity plays an important role in Argentina's defense strategy, be-
cause it has argued that its financial crisis led to a state of necessity, thus
giving reason for the suspension of payments on its external bonds. On
the other hand, some contend that Argentina's crisis was a result of the
inability of the country to implement the advice it received from many
experts, including the IMF,2 3 6 therefore excluding the possibility of in-
voking state of necessity under the ILC Articles. The IMF's own report
states:
The catastrophic collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001-02 rep-
resents the failure of Argentine policy makers to take necessary cor-
rective measures at a sufficiently early stage. The IMF on its part,
supported by its major shareholders, also erred in failing to call an
earlier halt to support for a strategy that, as implemented, was not
sustainable.237
The arbitral tribunal in the Italian bondholders' cases has to determine
whether such a plea justifies non-payment of financial obligations by the
state, and whether there are any grounds for not allowing necessity to be
232. Id.
233. See id. Thus, the trend in the international practice became to consider not only
the self-preservation aspect, but also other interests of the state. Such was the
understanding of the arbitral tribunal in the Torrey Canyon incident, which recog-
nized the British excuse of environmental necessity. A Liberian super tanker car-
rying a cargo of approximately 120,000 of crude oil was shipwrecked off the coast
of Cornwall, in England, causing an environmental disaster. Faced with
probability of the tanker breaking apart and creating even further environmental
damage, the British bombed the vessel so as to burn off the remaining oil.
234. Id.
235. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 128, art. 25.
236. Josie E. ALVAREZ, TIIE PUl3LIC INTERNATIONAL LAw REGIME GOVERNING IN-
TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 255 (2011).
237. Report on the Evaluation of the Role of the IMF in Argentina: 1991-2001, INT'I.
MONETARY FUND, 64 (2004), http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2004/arg/eng/pdf/
report.pdf.
SOVEREIGN BOND DISPUTES
invoked. So far, such argument has not been completely successful in
courts and tribunals.
The Argentine government has recently raised the necessity defense
plea in German courts. In 2007, the Constitutional Court in Germany
ruled that Argentina defaulting on its debt does not even justify a short-
term refusal to repay its debt to private creditors. 238 The decision stated
that Argentina's economic recovery meant that it could no longer argue
that it did not have enough money to service its debt. 2 3 9
Despite such understanding, many scholars have been sympathetic to-
wards Argentina's troubles and have been ever more doubtful of the mer-
its of the investment regime to solve situations which involves a financial
crisis. Schreuer recently declared that he doubted that the ICSID invest-
ment arbitration regime was deemed to settle financial crisis and state of
necessity disputes.240
Thus, the problem today is not just whether an arbitral tribunal is com-
petent to settle sovereign bond disputes, but whether an arbitral tribunal
should be competent to settle disputes related to a financial crisis at all.
As emphasized by Alvarez, this question is deemed to become more
prominent in discussions on the prospects of the investment regime as
well as on possible institutional reforms.241 The following section looks at
these discussions and complaints that have been generated so far by the
Argentine cases.
V. MAPPING THE DEFICITS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
ARBITRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME
In May 2009, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Trade Sub-
committee of the U.S. Congress held a hearing to consider changes in the
investment obligations contained in U.S. BITs in order to ensure that
U.S. Free Trade Agreements ('FTAs') and BITs "advance the public in-
terest." 242 Amongst some of the concerns expressed regarding the invest-
ment provisions, the doubt as to "whether FTAs and BITs were giving
governments the 'regulatory and policy' space needed to protect the envi-
ronment and the public welfare" was expressed. 243
Approximately one year later, in August 2010, a group of thirty-seven
professors of law issued a public statement (the "Osgoode Hall State-
ment") that originated from debates held at the Osgoode Hall Law
238. Stephan W. Schill, German Constitutional Court Rules on Necessity in Argentine
Bondholder Case, AM. Soc'Y 01 INr'i L. (July 31, 2007), http://www.asil.org/
insights070731.cfm.
239. Id.
240. Schreuer, supra note 61.
241. AivAj/., supra note 236, at 257.
242. Hearing on Investment Protections in U.S. Trade and Investment Agreement: Hear-
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School in Canada.2 4 4 The statement expressed the concern for the dam-
age done to the public welfare by the current investment regime. Pursu-
ant to the professors, "states have a fundamental right to regulate on
behalf of the public welfare and this right must not be subordinated to the
interests of investors where the right to regulate is exercised in good faith
and for a legitimate purpose." 2 4 5
Thus, in spite of the recent increase of investment treaties and an ap-
parent increase of investment arbitrations registered under the ICSID
Convention, 246 much has been going on to suggest a universal criticism
against investor-state arbitrations. 247 There has been a decrease in the
number of investment agreements being negotiated and an increase in
national laws that does not grant foreign investors as many rights as once
contemplated. 2 4 8 Bolivia and Ecuador have denounced the ICSID Con-
vention. 2 4 9 Other Latin American states, such as Nicaragua and Vene-
zuela, are contemplating to take the same path.2 5 0 Many negative
reactions towards the claims and awards against the Argentine govern-
ment can also be included amongst this current backlash against invest-
ment arbitration.
The next sections seek to address some of the concerns towards the
current investment regime, focusing on some issues posed by the use of
arbitration to settle financial crisis disputes. It should be noted in ad-
vance that this section does not intend to create further dilemma by stat-
ing that the arbitral mechanism is not appropriate to resolve public policy
disputes. Criticizing the present regime is much easier than proposing
changes.
As well put by Waibel et al,2 5 1 the investment regime is ready to listen
and should be able to gain much with constructive criticism. But, listen-
ing and adapting to these critiques is necessary, or else all benefits
achieved so far will shortly be threatened. Therefore, unless these con-
cerns are addressed and reform to the current system is made, host coun-
tries, investors and arbitral practitioners are bound to lose.
244. Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGooDEt HALu LAw
Sciutoot. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/docu-
ments/Public%20Statement%20%28June%202011 %29.pdf.
245. Id. 1 4.
246. See INT'L CTR. FOR SE7rLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTEs, ICSID CASELOAD - Statistics
7-9 (July 2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSIDIFrontServiet?re-
questType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistics.
247. ALVAREZ, supra note 236, at 347.
248. Id. at 348.
249. Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Bits: Impact on Investor-State Claims,
U.N.C.T.A.D. HA ISSUEs NonE No. 2 (Dec. 2010), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
webdiaeia20106_en.pdf.
250. Id.
251. MicntAB! WAIBEL ET AL., THtE BACKLASII AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBIRATION:
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A. INCONSISTENT INVESTMENT ARBITRAL AWARDS
Two recent ICSID awards, namely LG&E v. Argentine Republic252 and
CMS v. Argentine Republic253 have distressed stakeholders of the invest-
ment arbitration regime. In LG&E, the tribunal decided that the finan-
cial crisis in Argentina equated to a state of necessity, while eighteen
months before, the tribunal in CMS achieved a different conclusion while
analyzing practically the same facts.254 These conflicting decisions on the
application of the state of necessity in international law suggest that in-
vestor-state arbitration is not as foreseeable and constant as some would
have anticipated.
These decisions are not the only ones that have produced concerns.
Interpreting the meaning and scope of "investment" included in BITs, the
interpretation of the most favored nation clause, and umbrella clauses
have also been a source of disagreements. On the other hand, it has been
noted that arbitral tribunals cite decisions of prior tribunals in their own
awards. Thus, there is not a complete disregard to previous decisions.
The imprecision of many investment treaties, as well as of the ICSID
Convention, could probably explain these diverging opinions. But, it be-
comes harder to explain these inconsistencies when the problem arises
from treaties that have the same language or disputes with similar facts.
Even further, it is very challenging to explain such lack of consistency
when it comes from the arbitrators themselves. For instance, ICJ judge
Francisco Rezek was the appointed arbitrator from Argentina in both the
CMS and LG&E cases.255 Two different decisions were rendered with no
dissenting opinions.
Explaining the possible reasons for such an outcome, Alvarez cited Jan
Paulsson, which suggested that this reflects the notion that there is no
need to issue a dissenting opinion when the main duty of an arbitrator is
solve a dispute and to do so in a way that will make it easy for the win-
ning party to enforce the award. 256
This inconsistency is also an issue in the present Italian bondholder
dispute. Three different arbitral tribunals were constituted in order to
solve disputes relating to exactly the same facts. Because there is a lack
of transparency in the process due to the confidentiality principle of arbi-
tration and taking into account that arbitrators from different tribunals
are not allowed to discuss the disputes amongst themselves, it is possible
that three different decisions will be rendered on the same subject-
matter.
252. LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Cae No. ARB/02/1.
253. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8.
254. Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State's Power to
Handle Economic Crises, 24 J. INr'L Aiu. 265 (2007).
255. Michael Waibel, Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E,
20 LUn1i3N J. INr'i L. 637 (2007).
256. ALVARFY, supra note 236, at 363.
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These problems are maximized due to a lack of a permanent court that
can establish precedents and appoint arbitrators specialized in public law,
and of an effective and statutory mechanism to deal with sovereign debt
restructurings and defaults.
. ICSID Annulment Process as a Form of Appellate Review
Another relatively new concern with the present system regards the
annulment procedure embodied in Article 52 of the ICSID Conven-
tion.2 5 7 Conceived and designed as a very narrow procedure, some An-
nulment Committees have been very expansive on their annulment
awards due to the fact that they disagree with the award.
Such problem has become even more apparent with the issuance of the
annulment decisions in CMS, 2 5 8 Enron,259 and Sempra.260 Notwithstand-
ing the very narrow nature of the ICSID annulment process and the fact
that it is not intended to be a form of appellate review, this is precisely
what happened with these three decisions. Jos6 E. Alvarez precisely de-
scribes the situation:
States and investors now face three distinct annulment outcomes
arising from strikingly similar cases. In one case, CMS, an annul-
ment committee severely criticizes but does not annul a decision con-
tending that to do so would be to confuse a wrongful application of
the law from an act that fails to apply the correct law. The second,
Sempra, goes ahead and annuls a comparable decision for failing to
distinguish customary law from Article XI of the United States-Ar-
gentina BIT, ignoring the earlier annulment committee's warning
against acting as an appellate court. The third, Enron, affirms the
very same legal findings annulled in Sempra but annuls the underly-
ing award for failing to apply the customary defence that Sempra
found to be improper!261
Thus, while annulment decisions have not been limited to instances
where the tribunal has "manifestly exceeded its powers" or where there
has been a "serious departure from a fundamental rule or procedure,"
257. Article 52(1) establishes the grounds for the request of the annulment of the
award: "(1) Either Party may request annulment of the award by an application in
writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following
grounds: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal
has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a
member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a funda-
mental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on
which it is based." ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules art. 52, Oct. 14,
1966, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-
final.pdf.
258. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Annulment Decision (Sept. 25, 2007).
259. Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/3, Decision on Annulment (July 30, 2010).
260. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision
on Annulment (June 29, 2010).
261. Alvarez, supra note 236, at 292.
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the confidence in the system and the legitimacy of ICSID becomes, in
turn, seriously undermined.
B. THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY
The "threat to sovereignty" argument stated against the investor-state
regime does not concern the BITs and FTAs entered into by the govern-
ments. Even though these agreements allow individuals to have rights
against the state, they do not violate the nation's right to self-determina-
tion. On the contrary, it is one of the ways the state can exercise this
right. Such understanding was consolidated in the 1923 Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) S.S. Wimbledon case. 2 6 2 The tribunal
stated:
The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a
State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular
act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention
creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exer-
cise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires
them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into
international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty. 263
Therefore, if a state-Argentina, for instance-no longer agrees with
the terms of the treaties it entered into, it should terminate or amend
them, but not unilaterally decide to not comply with the obligations set
therein, in light of the pacta sunt servanda principle requires compliance.
On the other hand, as declared in the Osgoode Hall Statement,264
States have the right to regulate on behalf of the public welfare.265 In
cases involving a financial crisis, for instance, a state should be given
more regulatory space by the international community.
But, a balance needs to be reached with regard to the appropriate mea-
sures that can be taken by a government when facing a financial crisis.
Up to what point can the rights of individuals be neglected in the name of
public interest? The take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer launched by the
Argentinean government offered investors a 66.3% reduction of the orig-
inal value of the bonds. 2 6 6 On the other hand, had the Argentine govern-
ment not made such an offer, the restructuring of the state might not
have been possible at all. Was then the right to regulate exercised in
good faith and for a legitimate purpose?
In light of the complexity of such issues, the international community
has been questioning whether investment treaty arbitration is a fair, inde-
pendent, and balanced method to solve investment disputes.
262. S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Japan), 1923 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 1, 1 35 (Aug. 17).
263. Id.
264. Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, supra note 244.
265. Id. $ 4.
266. J.F. HORNBil(K, CONG. RFslIARCit Sinv., R41029, AnalNTINA's DiA'uIE
Sovi;unIGN Diawrr: DGAIAuNG wrmi ii n Hoi Douris 11(2011).
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C. THREAT TO HUMAN RIGHTS
Even if there is not a threat to the sovereignty of nations, will the mea-
sures in furtherance of human rights obligations conflict with the interna-
tional obligations to protect foreign investors and their activities?
Human rights obligations have been invoked by the Argentine govern-
ment in several occasions to rebut allegations of BIT breaches. Under
this argument, treaty breaches that were a result of emergency measures
taken in the face of the financial crisis would be excused due to the obli-
gation of the government to protect the basic rights and liberties of Ar-
gentine citizens. Nevertheless, when faced with such a broad human
rights argument, tribunals have been reaching different conclusions. 267
In Continental Casualty v. The Argentine Republic, the tribunal argued
that it was impossible to deny that a crisis that brought about extreme
social and economic hardship to the country qualified as a situation
where the maintenance of public order and the protection of essential
security interest were crucial.268 The tribunal stated:
The fact that Argentina's Congress declared a "public emergency" in
economic, financial, exchange, social and administrative matters in
conformity with Art. 76 of its Constitution, and enacted a specific
"Public Emergency Law" to cope with the crisis, is powerful evi-
dence of its gravity such as that could not be addressed by ordinary
measures. The protection of essential security interests recognized
by Art. XI does not require that "total collapse" of the country or
that a "catastrophic situation" has already occurred before responsi-
ble national authorities may have recourse to its protection. The in-
vocation of the clause does not require that the situation has already
degenerated into one that calls for the suspension of constitutional
guarantees and fundamental liberties. There is no point in having
such protection if there is nothing left to protect. 269
On the other hand, in Sempra v. The Argentine Republic, a witness for
the claimants argued that the American Convention on Human Rights
compelled Argentina to sustain its constitutional order in spite of the
2001 financial crisis. 270 The tribunal decided that the Argentina's consti-
tutional order was not imperiled by the crisis and that many policy mea-
sures were available other than the emergency measures taken.271 It
argued that even if the emergency legislation was necessary, the legiti-
mately acquired rights could have been somehow accommodated. 272
267. LUKE E. PETERSON, HUMAN RiGarfS AND) BILATERAL INVESTMFNT TREATIES:
MAPPING THE RoLE OF HUMAN RIGHTs LAw WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRA-
TION 29-30 (2009), available at http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/global-
ization/HIRA-volume3-ENG.pdf.
268. Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award
(Sept. 5, 2008).
269. Id. 180.
270. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award,$ 331 (Sept., 28, 2007).
271. Id. 1 332.
272. Id.
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In more recent cases, particularly those involving foreign investors in
the privatized water sector, the human rights defense has been evoked
even more forcefully. In Vivendi Universal SA v. The Argentine Republic,
for instance, the tribunal noted that human rights and treaty obligations
are not inconsistent, contradictory or mutually exclusive.273 Therefore,
Argentina could have respected both types of obligations.
Thus, in this context, arbitrators face a difficult and novel task of judg-
ing how states are supposed to comply with both human rights and eco-
nomic law obligations.
D. PRO INVESTOR BIAS
There are some concerns that there is a pro investor bias in investment
arbitration. Gus Van Harten argues that arbitrators lack security of ten-
ure and therefore are more susceptible to financial and business compli-
cations.274 Therefore, arbitrators are more vulnerable and their views
end up reflecting, to some extent, those of the appointing authorities. 275
National judges, on the other hand, are financially independent, because
they receive their income regardless of how they perform in individual
cases, and are appointed for a fixed period of time.2 7 6
The hearing held by the Committee on Ways and Means and the Trade
Subcommittee of the US Congress also expressed such concern that the
investment treaties entered into by the government provided less policy
space to the state due to the protections given to investors. 277
But, there is no evidence to support such allegations. First, the ap-
pointment of at least two arbitrators is not made by the investor-claimant
and none of those chosen to be part of the Annulment Committees owe
their appointment to a member of the business community or to the dis-
puting parties.
Also, a good number of cases are dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds, 278 and the largest available analysis on investor-state awards in-
dicates that 58 percent of cases were won by respondent states, while 39
percent of the cases were won by investors.279
Nevertheless, the 39 percent of cases won by investors does not prove
whether such cases should have been really won by them. Even further,
these studies are only on the publicized investor-state awards. No one
can be quite sure what happens in the universe of the non-publicized
decisions.
An additional feature brought to light by these studies is that even
when the investor claim prevails, the amount of damages awarded to in-
273. Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 1
240 (July 30, 2010).
274. VAN HARTIrN, supra note 19.
275. Id.
276. Id. 167-8
277. Hearing, supra note 242.
278. Schreuer, supra note 61.
279. AiVAluY, supra note 236, at 389.
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vestors is much less than that requested. But, such facet might only
demonstrate that the amounts sought by claimants are immeasurably
overstated. Nonetheless, these numbers bring the concerns towards in-
vestment arbitration closer to reality and discourage pro-investor un-
founded allegations.
There is a relatively new aspect that should also be considered when
questioning about pro-investor bias. As previously mentioned, some Ad
Hoc Annulment Committees have been very expansive on the annulment
procedure because they disagree with the awards and have been annul-
ling many decisions in favor of Argentina. Not only this new trend leads
the whole system astray, but also appears to contradict claims of pro-
investor bias.
VI. CONCLUSION
As countries attract unsustainable debts, there is a growing need to
restructure their debt. But, absent an effective restructuring mechanism,
creditors facing default are confronted with only two possible outcomes
while seeking payment on defaulted debt: either getting bound to the ex-
change offer or resorting to national courts. Considering the ineffective-
ness of the legal remedies available in national courts, ICSID arbitration
offers benefits that could increase protection to investors, though not
without setbacks.
If arbitration through ICSID becomes the dispute resolution mecha-
nism to solve sovereign debt related issues, there would be a drastic
change in sovereign debt restructurings and in the international arena.
Arbitrators would be empowered to review and discipline states public
policies, in what might become a threat to sovereignty, and the policy
space of governments facing a financial crisis is likely to decrease. Fur-
ther, the probability that creditors will holdout and not participate in the
debt restructuring proceedings in order to submit their claims to arbitra-
tion due to a higher expected recovery will possibly increase.
Therefore, even though it has been proved that ICSID has jurisdiction
over sovereign bond claims, at present it does not have the appropriate
tools to adjudicate such disputes because, as highlighted by Schreuer, 280
the ICSID investment arbitration regime was not even established to set-
tle financial crisis and state of necessity disputes.
Notwithstanding these setbacks, the existing alternatives to solve dis-
putes related to sovereign default and debt restructurings, such as na-
tional courts in host countries, inspire even less confidence than the
current investment arbitration regime. As Gary Born stated, "In fact, the
truth is less clear-cut, and lies somewhere between these extremes: 'The
more enthusiastic of [its sponsors] have thought of arbitration as a univer-
sal panacea. We doubt whether it will cure corns or bring general beati-
tude. Few panaceas work as well as advertised.' At bottom, if
280. Schreuer, supra note 61.
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generalizations must be made, international arbitration is much like de-
mocracy; it is nowhere close to ideal, but it is generally better than the
existing alternatives." 2 8 1
281. GARY B. BORN, IN jIRNATIONAL COMM~itCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY
AND MATERIALs 10-11 (2001).
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